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Abstract
In 1996 Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover considered the following model. An
assembly consisting of n voters exercises roll-call. All n! possible orders in which
the voters may be called are assumed to be equiprobable. The votes of each voter
are independent with expectation 0 < p < 1 for an individual vote “yea”. For a
given decision rule v the pivotal voter in a roll-call is the one whose vote finally
decides the aggregated outcome. It turned out that the probability to be pivotal is
equivalent to the Shapley-Shubik index. Here we give an easy combinatorial proof
of this coincidence, further weaken the assumptions of the underlying model, and
study generalizations to the case of more than two alternatives.
Keywords: simple games, influence, Shapley-Shubik index, several levels of approval
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1 Introduction
Consider a course in which there are two in-course assessments and an end-of-course
examination. Assuming the 5-letter grade system from the US, what should be the course
result of a student achieving a D, a C, and a B in the three assessments? In practice
the most common procedure is the following: The letter grades are first converted to
numerical values and a weighted mean is computed, which then is rounded and converted
back to a letter grade. There may be additional rules describing the special case of a
failure. Two Fs may force a final F or an F in the end-of-course examination has to result
in an F unless it is balanced by two assessments which are graded C or better.
In Germany the school system, roughly spoken, splits into three different branches,
where the most reputable branch is called “Gymnasium”. In Bavaria there are some strict
rules regulating the access to a Gymnasium. After the forth year the grads of mathe-
matics, german, and local history and geography, ranging from 1 to 6, are considered. Iff
the sum is at most 7, then the student is allowed to access a Gymnasium without any
additional acceptance test.
The underlying structure of both examples can be formalized as follows. Let v : Jn →
K be a mapping that aggregates n inputs, whose values are contained in J , into a single
output, which is contained in K. In our first example we have n = 3 and J = K =
{A,B,C,D,F} with A > B > C > D > E. In our second example we have n = 3,
1
J = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, and K = {denial, access} with access > denial and 1 > 2 > 3 >
4 > 5 > 6. In the following we will assume that the sets J and K are strictly ordered.
W.l.o.g. we will mostly use the sets J = {1, . . . , j} and K = {1, . . . , k} for two positive
integers j, k with the usual ordering over the integers. The school context is by far
not the only area of application for these aggregation functions. Every committee that
takes its decision by votes according to some specific voting rule is an example. The
binary case, where J = K = {yes,no}, is extensively treated in the voting literature. For
examples with (j, k) 6= (2, 2) we refer the interested reader e.g. to [8].
A classical question in this context asks for the influence of a committee member (or
voter) on the aggregated decision. To this end so-called power indices where introduced.
For the binary case, the Shapley-Shubik index, introduced in [17], is one of the most
commonly used power indices. Besides an axiomatic foundation of the Shapley-Shubik
index [2], there is also a picturesque description: Assume that the voters express their
support for a proposal one after the other. At some point the support is large enough so
that the aggregated group decision will be an acceptance in any case. The corresponding
voter is called a pivot. With this, the Shapley-Shubik index of a voter i is the fraction
of the arrangements of the voters where voter i is a pivot. In [3] the model is extended
to a roll-call where each voter can either say “yes” or “no“. The average number of cases
where a voter is pivotal coincides with the Shapley-Shubik index. Here the expectation
for a “yes” need not be equal to 12 to preserve this property. A sufficient condition is
the independence and equality of expectations of the random variables for the voters,
as already observed in [14] without proof. The proof in [3] uses the axiomatization of
the Shapley-Shubik index as a indirect approach and reports of combinatorial difficulties
for the direct approach. Here we give an easy combinatorial proof and weaken the
assumptions, i.e., we assume that the probability for s “yes”- and n− s “no”-votes only
depends on the number s. Note that the same result was previously obtained in [10,
Proposition 4], as we found out recently.
The generalization of the Shapley-Shubik index to the non-binary case can be traced
back at least to [4], where a third input alternative was considered. In full generality
this was treated in [6], see also [19]. Here we present a consistent theory that covers the
binary case, the general non-binary case, and the limiting case with an infinite number
of alternatives in both the input and the output. The first basic building blocks for such
a unified theory where sketched in [11], see also [12].
A main assumption of our considerations is the strict ordering of the sets of alter-
natives. For the case of unordered alternatives we refer the interested reader to e.g.
[1].
The remaining part of this paper is structures as follows. In Section 2 we define the
class of games with several alternatives in the input and output. The Shapley-Shubik
index for simple games is reinterpreted as a measure for uncertainty reduction in the
roll-call model and generalized to the previously defined more general class of games
in Section 3. The main result that the chance for being the pivotal player in a simple
game is almost independent of the probability distribution of the votes is formalized
in Theorem 17 in Section 4. The corresponding proof is purely combinatorial. See
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[10, Proposition 4] for an earlier proof and [13, Theorem 1] for a characterization of such
probability distributions. As a possible justification of the presented generalized influence
measure we present some first preliminary results on an axiomatization in Section 5.
Games with a continuous infinite number of alternatives in the input and output are
addressed in Section 6. We draw a conclusion in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
Definition 1 For J,K ⊆ R and n ∈ N>0 the mapping v : J
n → K is called (J,K) game
on n players. For the special sets J = {1, . . . , j} and K = {1, . . . , k}, where j = |J | and
k = |K|, we speak of (j, k) games and denote the set of of (j, k) games on n players by
Gnj,k.
Since those mappings are not very interesting for |K| = 1 or |J | = 1, we assume
|J |, |K|, j, k ≥ 2 in the remaining part of the paper. We also speak of non-trivial games
in order to highlight the assumption.
Definition 2 A (J,K) game v on n players is called monotonic if we have v(a) ≥ v(b)
for all a, b ∈ Jn with a ≥ b, where (a1, . . . , an) ≥ (b1, . . . , bn) iff ai ≥ bi for all 1 ≤ i ≤
n. By Snj,k we denote the set of of all monotonic (j, k) games on n players, which are
surjective.1
We remark that Sn2,2 is in bijection with the set of simple games on n players, see
e.g. [18] for an overview on simple games. Simple games are models for simple voting
situations, where each player can either vote “yes” or “no”. The set S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} := N
of “yes”-players is called coalition. The most common formalization of a simple game is
given by v˜ : 2N → {0, 1} with v˜(∅) = 0, v˜(N) = 1, and v˜(S) ≤ v˜(T ) for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆
T ⊆ N . v˜(S) = 1 means an aggregated “yes“ and v˜(S) = 0 an aggregated “no”. The
set notation is just an abbreviation to state that the players in S are voting “yes” (or
1) and the players in N\S are voting “no” (or 0). The bijection from 2N to {0, 1}n
is just the characteristic vector of a set. It is easy to check that a simple game on n
players is equivalent to a ({0, 1}, {0, 1}) game. In the corresponding (2, 2) game the
inputs and outputs are just increased by 1. We remark that in the field of threshold logic
the representation of a (weighted) simple game with J = K = {−1, 1} is more common.
Definition 3 Two players 1 ≤ i, h ≤ n are called equivalent in a (J,K) game v on n
players, if we have v(a) = v(π(a)) for all a ∈ Jn, where π is the transposition between i
and h.
A classical question in this context asks for the influence of a committee member
(or voter) on the aggregated decision. For a simple game v˜ : 2N → {0, 1} the so-called
1In [6] these objects were called (j, k) simple games related to the notion of simple games, where the
inputs are labeled in the reverse order. However, in the older papers “simple” just refers to the binary
input and output. Being more precise, some authors speak of monotonic simple games.
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Shapley-Shubik index, see [17], of player 1 ≤ i ≤ n in v˜ is given by
ϕ˜i(v˜) =
1
n!
·
∑
∅⊆S⊆N\{i}
|S|! · (n− 1− |S|)! · (v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)) . (1)
It can be interpreted as a weighted marginal contribution and is just a specialization of
the Shapley value for transferable utility (TU) games, see [16]. In the next section we
will describe an influence measure for (j, k) games similar to the Shapley-Shubik index.
The extreme case of having absolutely no influence is captured by:
Definition 4 Let v be a (J,K) game on n players. If we have
v(a1, . . . , an) = v(a1, . . . , ai−1, x, ai+1, . . . , an)
for all a1, . . . , an, x ∈ J , player i is called a null player.
Of course this general definition is consistent with the definition of a null player in a
simple game v˜ and we have ϕ˜i(v˜) = 0 for each null player i. For equivalent players h, i
we have ϕ˜h(v˜) = ϕ˜i(v˜).
3 The Shapley-Shubik index as a measurement for the re-
duction of uncertainty
If the votes of all n players are known, then the aggregated decision is uniquely determined
by the underlying game. In order to evaluate the influence of each player on the final
outcome, one can think of the voting situation as a roll-call, c.f. [3]. Each player declares
her vote one after the other. In the case of a binary outcome, i.e., |K| = 2, there
exists a certain player i whose declaration uniquely determines the outcome for the first
time. The respective player is commonly called pivotal, cf. Definition 10. Of course the
pivotality depends on the ordering of the players in this context. For more than two
output alternatives the set of possible outcomes may shrink several times.
Definition 5 Let v be a (J,K) game on n players and Sn be the set of all bijections
of N , i.e., the set of all permutations of N = {1, . . . , n}. For each 1 ≤ h ≤ n we set
τh : G
n
J,K × Sn × J
n → {0, . . . , |K| − 1},
τh(v, π, a1, . . . , an) =
∣∣{v(a′1, . . . , a′n) : a′l = al if π(l) < h and a′l ∈ J otherwise}∣∣
−
∣∣{v(a′1, . . . , , a′n) : a′l = al if π(l) ≤ h and a′l ∈ J otherwise}∣∣ ,
where GnJ,K denotes the set of (J,K) game on n players.
So, given an ordering π of the n players and a specific input (a1, . . . , an), the value of
τh(v, π, a1, . . . , an) displays the decrease of our uncertainty of the final outcome after the
hth player, according to π, has declared her vote. The initial uncertainty is | im(v)| − 1,
where
im(v) = {v(a1, . . . , an) : ai ∈ J ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n}
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denotes the image of the mapping v, i.e., there are | im(v)| possible outcomes before the
first player declares her vote and a unique outcome after the last player has declared her
vote. By summing over all possible orderings and all possible inputs we obtain a general
measurement for influence after normalization:
Definition 6 For each positive integer n, each integer 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and each sets J,K ⊆ R
with |J |, |K| ≥ 2 we set ϕi : GnJ,K → R≥0 with
ϕi(v) =
1
n!
·
1
|J |n
·
1
| im(v)| − 1
·
∑
(pi,a1,...,an)∈Sn×Jn
τpi−1(i)(v, π, a1, . . . , an) (2)
if | im(v)| > 1 and ϕi(v) = 0 otherwise.
We remark that we have | im(v)| = |K| if v is surjective. Via the normalization factors,
the influence measure of Definition 6 obtains a nice property that is called efficiency in
the context of power indices.
Lemma 7 For each v ∈ GnJ,K with | im(v)| > 1 we have
n∑
i=1
ϕi(v) = 1 and ϕi(v) ∈ [0, 1]
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.2
Proof. For each π ∈ Sn and each (a1, . . . , an) ∈ J
n we have
n∑
i=1
τpi−1(i)(v, π, a1, . . . , an) =
n∑
h=1
τh(v, π, a1, . . . , an) = | im(v)| − 1.

Definition 8 We call v ∈ Gnj,k output-rough if
{
v(a′1, . . . , a
′
n) : a
′
l = al if π(l) ≤ h and a
′
l ∈ J otherwise
}
is an interval3 for all (a1, . . . , an) ∈ J
n, π ∈ Sn, 1 ≤ h ≤ n.
We remark each (j, 2) game is output-rough. An example of a surjective and mono-
tonic (2, 3) game that is not output-rough ins given in Example 19. An example of a
surjective, monotonic, output-rough (2, 3) game v is given by v(1, 1) = 1, v(2, 2) = 3,
and v(1, 2) = v(2, 1) = 2.
For the case of surjective, monotonic, output-rough (j, k) games with j, k ≥ 2, Equa-
tion (2) can be simplified significantly.
2We remark that the Shapley-Shubik index for simple games, based on Equation (1), is not efficient
in all non-monotonic cases. For v˜(∅)= v({2}) = v({1, 2})= 0, v˜({1})= 1 we would have ϕ˜1(v˜) =
1
2
and
ϕ˜2(v˜) = −
1
2
.
3We call a set M ⊆ Z an interval if there exist a, b ∈ R with M = [a, b] ∩ Z.
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Lemma 9 For each non-trivial, surjective, monotonic, output-rough (j, k) game v on n
players and each integer 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have
ϕi(v) =
1
n!
·
1
jn
·
1
k − 1
· (3)
∑
(pi,a=(a1,...,an))∈Sn×Jn
(
vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a)− vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a)
)
−
(
vpi,pi−1(i)(a)− vpi,pi−1(i)(a)
)
,
where vpi,h(a) = v(a
′
1, . . . , a
′
n) with a
′
l = al if π(l) ≤ h and a
′
l = j otherwise; vh(b) =
v(b′1, . . . , b
′
n) with b
′
l = bl if π(l) ≤ h and b
′
l = 1 otherwise.
Proof. Due to monotonicity and output-roughness we have{
v(a′1, . . . , a
′
n) : a
′
l = al if π(l) ≤ h and a
′
l ∈ J otherwise
}
=
{
vpi,h(a), . . . , vpi,h(a)
}
for all 1 ≤ h ≤ n and all a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ J
n. 
For j = k = 2 the formula for ϕi can be simplified significantly, which is the topic
of the next section. Some more notation can be introduced for the slightly more general
case k = 2.
Definition 10 For j ≥ 2, let v be a surjective (j, 2) game on n players. Given an input
vector a ∈ Jn and an ordering π ∈ Sn we call a player 1 ≤ i ≤ n a pivot for a, π in v if
τpi−1(i)(v, π, a) = 1.
In other words, a player i is a pivot, if the declarations before player i still allow both
elements of K as possible outcomes while player i fixes the outcome (to either 1 or 2).
For a non-trivial, surjective, monotonic (j, k) game v we may describe
M =
{
v(a′1, . . . , a
′
n) : a
′
l = al if π(l) ≤ π(i) and a
′
l ∈ J otherwise
}
by bM1 , . . . , b
M
k−1 ∈ {−1, 0, 1} with
• bMh = −1 iff m ≤ h for all m ∈M ;
• bMh = 1 iff m > h for all m ∈M ;
• bMh = 0 otherwise.
If bMh switches from a zero to a non-zero value, then we may call player i an h-pivot
for a, π in v. The number of pivots for given a, π is k − 1. With this, ϕi(v) is equal
to the probability of a player i to be pivotal, assuming equiprobable input vectors and
orderings.
The notion of minimal winning coalitions can be generalized to non-trivial, surjective,
monotonic (j, 2) games.
Definition 11 Let v be a non-trivial, surjective, monotonic (j, 2) game on n players. A
vector a ∈ Jn is called a winning vector if v(a) = 2 and losing vector otherwise. If a is
a winning vector, but all vectors a′ < a are losing, then a is called a minimal winning
vector. Analogously a losing vector a is called maximal losing vector if a′ is a winning
vector for all a′ > a.4
4We write a > b for a ≥ b and a 6= b.
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We remark that v is uniquely described by its set of minimal winning or its set of maximal
losing vectors. The minimal winning vectors of Example 18 are given by (2, 3) and (3, 2).
The corresponding maximal losing vectors are given by (1, 3), (3, 1), and (2, 2).
4 The main result
Now we focus on the special case j = k = 2 and relate Equation (1) with Equation (3).
To this end we have to introduce some further notions for simple games.
Definition 12 Let v˜ be a simple game on n players. A coalition S ⊆ N\{i} is called an
i-swing if v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = 1, i.e., v(S ∪ {i}) = 1 and v(S) = 0.
With this we can rewrite Equation (1) to
ϕ˜i(v˜) =
1
n!
·
∑
S is an i−swing
|S|! · (n− 1− |S|)!.
Let v ∈ Sn2,2 correspond to v˜ and S be an i-swing for an arbitrary but fixed player i.
We set al = 2 if l ∈ S and al = 1 otherwise for all l ∈ N\{i}. With this we have
v(a1, . . . , ai−1, 1, ai+1, . . . , an) = 1 and v(a1, . . . , ai−1, 2, ai+1, . . . , an) = 2. So, if the
players in S are asked first, then still both outcomes 1 and 2 are possible. If player i
says 2, then the outcome is fixed to 2 due to the monotonicity of v. There are exactly
|S|! · (n − 1 − |S|)! orderings where the set of players before player i coincides with S.
There is another interpretation: If the players of N\(S ∪ {i}) are asked first, then still
both outcomes 1 and 2 are possible. If player i says 1, then the outcome is fixed to 1 due
to the monotonicity of v. From these observations we conclude:
Lemma 13 Let v˜ be a simple game on n players and v be the corresponding (2, 2) game.
We have
ϕ˜i(v˜) =
1
n!
·
∑
S is an i−swing
|S|! · (n− 1− |S|)!
=
1
n!
·
∑
(pi,a=(2,...,2))∈Sn×Jn
(
vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a)−vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a)
)
−
(
vpi,pi−1(i)(a)−vpi,pi−1(i)(a)
)
=
1
n!
·
∑
(pi,a=(1,...,1))∈Sn×Jn
(
vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a)−vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a)
)
−
(
vpi,pi−1(i)(a)−vpi,pi−1(i)(a)
)
.
So, the Shapley-Shubik index is the same as the influence measure from Definition 6
when all players say 2 (“yes”) or all players say 1 (“no”) in the roll-call model. Equation (1)
can be seen as a computational simplification. We will see shortly that the connection
between Equation (1) and the roll-call model is far more general than suggested by
Lemma 13. To this end denote by χh(a) the number of ai which are equal to h.
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Lemma 14 For v ∈ Sn2,2 we have
(
vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a)− vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a)
)
−
(
vpi,pi−1(i)(a)− vpi,pi−1(i)(a)
)
= 1 (4)
iff either
vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a) = vpi,pi−1(i)(a) = vpi,pi−1(i)(a) = 1, vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a) = 2, ai = 1
or
vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a) = 1, vpi,pi−1(i)(a) = vpi,pi−1(i)(a) = vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a) = 2, ai = 2.
Proof. Due to monotonicity the following cases are possible:
vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a) vpi,pi−1(i)(a) vpi,pi−1(i)(a) vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a)
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 2
1 1 2 2
1 2 2 2
2 2 2 2

Lemma 15 For integers 0 ≤ s ≤ h− 1 ≤ n− 1 we have
n−h∑
l=0
(
s+ l
s
)
·
(
n− s− 1− l
h− s− 1
)
=
(
n
h
)
.
Proof. The stated summation formula can be concluded from Vandermonde’s Identity.
Here we give a direct combinatorial proof by double counting. The number of ways to
choose h out of n objects is given by
(
n
h
)
. For a selection let l be an integer such that the
(s + 1)th chosen object is labeled s + l + 1, where we assume labels from 1 to n. Here l
can range from 0 to n− h and is uniquely determined. Since exactly s elements have to
be chosen before the (s + 1)th element and h − s − 1 elements have to be chosen after
the (s+1)th element, there are
(
s+l
s
)
·
(
n−s−1−l
h−s−1
)
possibilities. Summing over the possible
values for l gives the stated formula. 
Lemma 16 Let v˜ be a simple game on n players and v be the corresponding (2, 2) game.
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n and each 0 ≤ h ≤ n we have
(
n
h
)
·
∑
S is an i−swing
|S|! · (n− 1− |S|)!
=
∑
(pi,a)∈Sn×Jn with χ2(a)=h
(
vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a)− vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a)
)
−
(
vpi,pi−1(i)(a)− vpi,pi−1(i)(a)
)
.
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Proof. We prove the stated equation by double counting. The right hand side clearly
counts the number of cases (π, a) ∈ Sn × J
n with χ2(a) = h where Equation (4) is
satisfied.
Now let π ∈ Sn and a ∈ J
n with χ2(a) = h, where Equation (4) is satisfied, be
arbitrary but fixed. Set F = {l ∈ N : π(l) < π(i)} and B = {l ∈ N : π(l) > π(i)}, so
that F ∪ {i} ∪ B = N is a partition. If ai = 2, then we set S = {l ∈ F : al = 2}. If
ai = 1, then we choose S ⊆ N\{i} such that {l ∈ F : al = 1} = N\(S ∪ {i}). We can
easily check that S is an i-swing in both cases.
Now we start with a fixed i-swing S and count the corresponding pairs (π, a) as
described above. We can easily check that exactly one of the cases |S| ≤ h − 1 or
|N\(S ∪ {i})| ≤ n− h− 1 is satisfied.
• For the second case of Lemma 14 we need |S| ≤ h−1 and am = 2 for allm ∈ S∪{i}.
Exactly h − s − 1 out of the remaining n − s − 1 players have to vote 2 so that
χ2(a) = h. Choose a integer l so that the set F , as described above, has cardinality
|S| + l. Thus, we have |B| = n − |S| − 1 − l, 0 ≤ l ≤ n − h and l out of the
n − h players voting 1 have to be chosen for F . Since there are |F |! · |B|! fitting
permutations π, we obtain
(
n− s− 1
h− s− 1
)
·
n−h∑
l=0
(s+ l)! · (n − s− 1− l)! ·
(
n− h
l
)
=
n−h∑
l=0
(n− s− 1)! · (s + l)! · (n− s− 1− l)! · (n− h)!
(h− s− 1)! · (n− h)! · l! · (n − h− l)!
= s! · (n− s− 1)! ·
n−h∑
l=0
(
s+ l
s
)
·
(
n− s− 1− l
h− s− 1
)
Lemma 15
=
(
n
h
)
· s! · (n− s− 1)!
cases, where we use |S| = s as abbreviation.
• For the first case of Lemma 14 we need |N\(S ∪ {i})| ≤ n− h− 1 and am = 1 for
all m ∈ N\S. Exactly s− h out of the remaining s players have to vote 1 so that
χ2(a) = h. Choose a integer l so that the set F , as described above, has cardinality
n − s − 1 + l. Thus, we have |B| = s − l, 0 ≤ l ≤ h and l out of the h players
voting 2 have to be chosen for F . Since there are |F |! · |B|! fitting permutations π,
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we obtain
(
s
s− h
)
·
h∑
l=0
(n− s− 1 + l)! · (s− l)! ·
(
h
l
)
= s! · (n− s− 1)! ·
h∑
l=0
(
s′ + l
s′
)
·
(
n− s′ − 1− l
h′ − s′ − 1
)
= s! · (n− s− 1)! ·
n−h′∑
l=0
(
n− s− 1 + l
n− s− 1
)
·
(
s− l
s− h
)
cases using h′ = n − h and s′ = n − s − 1. Since n − s − 1 ≤ n − h − 1 we have
0 ≤ s′ ≤ h′−1 ≤ n−1, so that we can apply Lemma 15. Using
(
n
h′
)
=
(
n
n−h
)
=
(
n
h
)
,
we have
(
n
h
)
· s! · (n− s− 1)! cases.

Applying Lemma 16 yields our main result:
Theorem 17 (Cf. [10, Proposition 4]) Let v˜ be a simple game on n players, v be the
corresponding (2, 2) game, and p : Jn → [0, 1] a probability measure with p(a) = p(b) for
all a, b ∈ Jn with χ2(a) = χ2(b). For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have
ϕ˜i(v˜) =
1
n!
·
∑
(pi,a=(a1,...,an))∈Sn×Jn
p(a) ·
( (
vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a)− vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a)
)
−
(
vpi,pi−1(i)(a)− vpi,pi−1(i)(a)
))
.
We remark that for p(a) = qχ2(a) ·(1−q)n−χ2(a) we obtain the result that the Shapley-
Shubik index of a player i in a simple game is equal to the probability of i being pivotal,
where the players’ votes are independent and the individual “yes”-votes have an expec-
tation of 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, cf. [14].
As a refinement we weaken the assumption that the individuals votes are independent
to, lets say, anonymous probabilities5 for the votes, i.e., the probability for a vector of
votes only depends on the number of “yes”-votes, which seems to be a very reasonable
assumption.
For the reverse statement of Theorem 17 we refer to [13, Theorem 1].
Setting p(2, . . . , 2) = 1 and p(a) = 0 otherwise, we can obtain Equation (1) as a
computational simplification of the general roll-call model with anonymous probabilities
for the votes in Theorem 17. (If ai = 2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we can simplify
(
vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a)− vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a)
)
−
(
vpi,pi−1(i)(a)− vpi,pi−1(i)(a)
)
to vpi,pi−1(i)(a)− vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a), which is equivalent to v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) for S = {l ∈ N :
π(l) < π(i)}.)
5Cf. [7].
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For p(a) = 12n we obtain ϕ˜i(v˜) = ϕi(v), which gives some justification for calling the
influence measure from Definition 6 the Shapley-Shubik index for (j, k) games. Using
the correspondence between i-swings and input vectors satisfying Equation (4) from the
proof of Theorem 17 we can directly prove this equation. Starting from an i-swing S we
write the set F as S ∪ X and set |X| = x. In contrast to the proof of Theorem 17 we
make no assumption on the values of al for l ∈ B. So, we have
(
n−s−1
x
)
possibilities for
X, 2n−s−x−1 possibilities for a, and (s + x)! · (n − s − x − 1)! possibilities for π, where
0 ≤ x ≤ n− s− 1. We compute
n−s−1∑
x=0
(s+ x)! · (n− s− x− 1)! ·
(
n− s− 1
x
)
· 2n−s−x−1
= s! · (n− s− 1)! ·
n−s−1∑
x=0
(
s+ x
x
)
· 2n−s−x−1
= s! · (n− s− 1)! ·
n−s−1∑
y=0
(
n− 1− y
n− s− 1− y
)
· 2y
corresponding possibilities.
For the first case of Lemma 14 we similarly have
(
s
x
)
possibilities for X, 2s−x pos-
sibilities for a, and (n − s − 1 + x)! · (s − x)! possibilities for π, where 0 ≤ x ≤ s. We
compute
s∑
x=0
(s− x)! · (n− s+ x− 1)! ·
(
s
x
)
· 2s−x
= s! · (n− s− 1)! ·
s∑
x=0
(
n− s− 1 + x
x
)
· 2s−x
= s! · (n− s− 1)! ·
s∑
y=0
(
n− 1− y
s− y
)
· 2y
corresponding possibilities.
The equation ϕ˜i(v˜) = ϕi(v), which was indirectly proven in [3] now follows from
n−s−1∑
y=0
(
n− 1− y
n− s− 1− y
)
· 2y

 +

 s∑
y=0
(
n− 1− y
s− y
)
· 2y

 = 2n. (5)
This is indeed a very interesting identity on its own. According to the computer algebra
system Maple the first sum can be simplified to 2n − 12 ·
(
n
s
)
· hypergeom
(
[1, n + 1], , 12
)
and the second sum can be simplified to 2n − 12 ·
(
n
s+1
)
· hypergeom
(
[1, n+ 1], [s + 2], 12
)
.
In the theory of hypergeometric series, see e.g. [9], the corresponding identity
(
n
s
)
· hypergeom
(
[1, n + 1], ,
1
2
)
+
(
n
s+ 1
)
· hypergeom
(
[1, n + 1], [s + 2],
1
2
)
= 2n+1
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might be well known. Arguably, one can speak of “rather formidable combinatorial
difficulties”, as done in [3]. Plugging in small values of s into Equation (5) and explicitly
evaluating the second sum gives some nice explicit identities. For s = 0 we obtain the
well known geometric series
∑n−1
y=0 2
y = 2n − 1. For s = 1, 2 we obtain
n−2∑
y=0
(n− 1− y) · 2y = 2n − n− 1
and
n−3∑
y=0
(n− 1− y) · (n− 2− y) · 2y−1 = 2n −
n2 + n+ 2
2
.
We finish this section by two examples showing that the situation of Theorem 17 can
not be generalized to arbitrary parameters j and k.
Example 18 Let v be a (3, 2) game on 2 players with v(a1, a2) = 2 iff (a1, a2) ≥ (3, 2)
or (a1, a2) ≥ (2, 3). So, the game v is surjective, monotonic, and output-rough. In the
following table we list the pivotal player for all combinations of the input vector a and
the ordering π. We assume that each player votes l with probability pl, i.e., p1, p2, p3 ≥ 0
and p1 + p2 + p3 = 1, and that the votes of the two players are independent.
a\π (1, 2) (2, 1) p(a)
(1, 1) 1 1 p1 · p1
(1, 2) 1 1 p1 · p2
(1, 3) 1 1 p1 · p3
(2, 1) 2 1 p2 · p1
(2, 2) 2 1 p2 · p2
(2, 3) 2 1 p2 · p3
(3, 1) 1 1 p3 · p1
(3, 2) 1 1 p3 · p2
(3, 3) 1 1 p3 · p3
Given the probabilities the (generalized) influence measure for player 2 is given by p12 and
the (generalized) influence measure for player 1 is given by 1 − p12 , i.e., the values are
not independent from the probability distribution.
Example 19 Let v be a (2, 3) game on 2 players with v(2, 2) = v(2, 1) = 3, v(1, 2) = 2,
and v(1, 1) = 1. So, the game v is surjective and monotonic but not output-rough. In the
following table we list for each player the reduction of uncertainty τ for all combinations of
the input vector a and the ordering π. We assume that each player votes l with probability
pl, i.e., p1, p2 ≥ 0 and p1+p2 = 1, and that the votes of the two players are independent.
a\π (1, 2) (2, 1) p(a)
(1, 1) 1:1,2:1 1:1,2:1 p1 · p1
(1, 2) 1:1,2:1 1:1,2:1 p1 · p2
(2, 1) 1:2,2:0 1:1,2:1 p2 · p1
(2, 2) 1:2,2:0 1:1,2:1 p2 · p2
12
Given the probabilities the (generalized) influence measure for player 2 is given by 1+p14
and the (generalized) influence measure for player 1 is given by 3−p12 , i.e., the values are
not independent from the probability distribution.
Also for (2, 2) games the conditions of Theorem 17 can not be weakened too much.
Example 20 Let v be the (2, 2) game on 3 players with v(a1, a2, a3) = 2 iff a1 = 1 and
a2 6= a3. So, v is surjective and output-rough but not monotonic. In the following table
we list the pivotal player for all combinations of the input vector a and the ordering π.
We assume that each player votes l with probability pl, i.e., p1, p2 ≥ 0 and p1 + p2 = 1,
and that the votes of the two players are independent.
a\π (1, 2, 3) (1, 3, 2) (2, 1, 3) (2, 3, 1) (3, 1, 2) (3, 2, 1) p(a)
(1, 1, 1) 1 1 1 3 1 2 p31
(1, 1, 2) 1 1 1 1 1 1 p21p2
(1, 2, 1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 p21p2
(1, 2, 2) 1 1 1 3 1 2 p1p
2
2
(2, 1, 1) 3 2 3 3 2 2 p21p2
(2, 1, 2) 3 2 3 1 2 1 p1p
2
2
(2, 2, 1) 3 2 3 1 2 1 p1p
2
2
(2, 2, 2) 3 2 3 3 2 2 p32
Given the probabilities the (generalized) influence measure for players 2 and 3 are given
by
1+2p2
2
6 and the (generalized) influence measure for player 1 is given by
4−4p2
2
6 , i.e., the
values are not independent from the probability distribution.
5 The axiomatic approach
The meaningfulness of influence measures or power indices is commonly justified by
providing some axioms which are satisfied by the measure and uniquely determine it.
Here we go along these lines for our influence measure from Definition 6. To this end
let v be a non-trivial (J,K) game on n players with | im(v)| > 1. Due to Lemma 7
the influence measure ϕ is efficient for v. For any null player i in v we obviously have
ϕi(v) = 0, i.e., ϕ satisfies the null player axiom. For each π ∈ Sn we define the game πv
by (πv)(a) = v
(
api(1), . . . , api(n)
)
. With this, we have ϕi(πv) = ϕpi(i)(v), which is called
the anonymity axiom. The transfer axiom is satisfied if we have
ϕi(u) + ϕi(w) = ϕi(u ∨ w) + ϕi(u ∧ w)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where (u∨w)(a) := max{u(a), w(a) and (u∧w)(a) := min{u(a), w(a).
Lemma 21 Let u,w be nontrivial, surjective, monotonic, output-rough (J,K) games.
Then, both u ∨ w and u ∧ w are nontrivial, surjective, monotonic, output-rough (J,K)
games.
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Proof. Obviously u ∨ w and u ∧ w are nontrivial, surjective, monotonic (J,K) games.
Next we prove that u ∧ w is output-rough. To this end let a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ J
n,
π ∈ Sn, and 1 ≤ h ≤ n arbitrary but fix. Choose integers α1, α2, β1, β2 such that{
u(a′1, . . . , a
′
n) : a
′
l = al if π(l) ≤ h and a
′
l ∈ J otherwise
}
= [α1, β1] ∩ Z
and
{
w(a′1, . . . , a
′
n) : a
′
l = al if π(l) ≤ h and a
′
l ∈ J otherwise
}
= [α2, β2] ∩ Z.
We will prove
{
(u ∧ w)(a′1, . . . , a
′
n) : a
′
l = al if π(l) ≤ h and a
′
l ∈ J otherwise
}
= [α3, β3] ∩ Z,
where α3 = min{α1, α2} and β3 = min{β1, β2}, in the following. We set
R =
{
(a′1, . . . , a
′
n) ∈ J
n : a′l = al if π(l) ≤ h
}
.
Now let γ ∈ [α3, β3]. If γ < α2 we choose a vector r ∈ R with u(r) = γ. Since w(r) > γ,
we have (u ∧ w)(r) = γ. Similarly, we can conclude the existence of an input vector
r ∈ R with (u ∧ w)(r) = γ if γ < α1, γ > β1, or γ > β2. In the remaining cases we
have α1 ≤ γ ≤ β1 and α2 ≤ γ ≤ β2. Now let Rγ be the set of elements r
′ ∈ R with
u(r′) = γ. If there exists an element r ∈ Rγ with w(r) ≥ γ, then (u ∧ w)(r) = γ. So, we
assume w(r′) < γ for all r′ ∈ Rγ and choose an arbitrary r
h ∈ Rγ . For each h < l ≤ n
we define rl by rli = r
l−1
i if π(i)! = l and r
l
i = j for π(i) = l. By construction we have
rh < · · · < rn = (j, . . . , j) and w(rn) ≥ γ. Let g be the smallest index with w(rg) ≥ γ and
w(rg−1) < γ. Since w is output-rough we can modify the input of player i with π(i) = g
in rg−1 to a vector r such that w(r) = γ and r ≥ rg−1. Since u(r) ≥ u(rg−1) ≥ γ we
have (u ∧ w)(r) = γ.
For u ∨ w we can similarly conclude
{
(u ∨ w)(a′1, . . . , a
′
n) : a
′
l = al if π(l) ≤ h and a
′
l ∈ J otherwise
}
= [α4, β4] ∩ Z,
where α4 = max{α1, α2}, β4 = max{β1, β2}, and α1, α2, β1, β2 are chosen as above. 
From Lemma 9 we conclude:
Lemma 22 For each non-trivial, surjective, monotonic, output-rough (J,K) games u
and w on n players we have ϕi(u) + ϕi(w) = ϕi(u ∨ w) + ϕi(u ∧ w) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
In other words, the influence measure ϕ from Definition 6 satisfies the four classical
axioms, used for the first axiomatization of the Shapley-Shubik index, see [2], on the
class of non-trivial, surjective, monotonic, output-rough (J,K) games.
Lemma 23 Let γ be a mapping from the set of non-trivial, surjective, monotonic (j, 2)
games on n players to ∆n := {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ [0, 1]
n :
∑n
i=1 xi = 1}. If γ satisfies the
transfer axiom, then γ(v) can be recursively computed from the values of γ for games
with a unique minimal winning coalition.
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Proof. We prove by induction on the number of minimal winning coalitions. By ua
we denote the game with unique minimal winning a. If the (pairwise different) minimal
winning vectors of v are given by a1, . . . , al, then we can write v = x ∨ y, where x =
ua1 ∨ . . . ual−1 and y = ual , so that x has l − 1 and y has 1 minimal winning vector.
Since x ∧ y has at most l − 1 winning vectors, we can compute recursively compute
γ(v) = γ(x) + γ(y)− γ(x ∧ y). 
For non-trivial, surjective, monotonic (2, 2) games anonymity, efficiency, and the null
player axiom uniquely determine the value of γ on each game consisting of a single
minimal winning vector. Here the null players obtain γi = 0 and the non-null players
obtain one divided by the number of non-null players. For (j, 2) games with j > 2 the
situation is more involved for our influence measure from Definition 6:
Example 24 Let v the the surjective, monotonic (4, 2) game on 3 players with unique
minimal winning vector (2, 3, 4). Next we determine the number of cases (a, π), where
each player is pivotal. For player 1 we consider the cases:
• π = (1, ⋆, ⋆): a1 = 1 → 2 · 1 · 4 · 4 = 32 cases;
• π = (2, 1, 3): a1 = 1, a2 ∈ {3, 4} → 1 · 1 · 2 · 4 = 8 cases;
• π = (3, 1, 2): a1 = 1, a3 = 4 → 1 · 1 · 4 · 1 = 4 cases;
• π = (⋆, ⋆, 1): a2 ∈ {3, 4}, a3 = 4 → 2 · 4 · 2 · 1 = 16 cases.
For player 2 we consider the cases:
• π = (2, ⋆, ⋆): a2 ∈ {1, 2} → 2 · 4 · 2 · 4 = 64 cases;
• π = (1, 2, 3): a1 = 1, a1 ∈ {2, 3, 4}, a2 ∈ {1, 2} → 1 · 3 · 2 · 4 = 24 cases;
• π = (3, 2, 1): a1 = 1, a2 ∈ {1, 2}, a3 = 4 → 1 · 4 · 2 · 1 = 8 cases;
• π = (⋆, ⋆, 2): a1 ∈ {2, 3, 4}, a3 = 4 → 2 · 3 · 4 · 1 = 24 cases.
For player 3 we consider the cases:
• π = (3, ⋆, ⋆): a3 ∈ {1, 2, 4} → 2 · 4 · 4 · 3 = 96 cases;
• π = (1, 3, 2): a1 = 1, a1 ∈ {2, 3, 4}, a3 ∈ {1, 2, 3} → 1 · 3 · 4 · 3 = 36 cases;
• π = (2, 3, 1): a1 = 1, a2 ∈ {3, 4}, a3 ∈ {1, 2, 3} → 1 · 4 · 2 · 3 = 24 cases;
• π = (⋆, ⋆, 3): a1 ∈ {2, 3, 4}, a2 ∈ {3, 4} → 2 · 3 · 2 · 4 = 48 cases.
Thus, we have ϕ1(v) =
60
386 =
5
32 , ϕ2(v) =
120
386 =
10
32 =
5
16 , and ϕ3(v) =
204
386 =
17
32 .
An additional property of our influence measure ϕ is that for a game v′ arising from
v by adding a null player l, we have ϕi(v
′) = ϕi(v) for all i 6= l (and ϕl(v
′) = 0).
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6 The limiting case
By the following normalization trick we can remove the 1
k−1 factor in Equation (3) in
Lemma 9. Instead of K = {1, . . . , k} we use K =
{
0
k−1 ,
1
k−1 , . . . ,
k−1
k−1
}
⊆ [0, 1]. Then the
v- and v-values contain the necessary factor itself.6 Without any substantial effect we
may also relabel the set of inputs from J = {1, . . . , j} to J =
{
0
j−1 ,
1
j−1 , . . . ,
j−1
j−1
}
⊆ [0, 1].
However, by simultaneously increasing j and k (possibly at different velocities) we obtain
an approximation of a voting scheme [0, 1]n → [0, 1]. We now introduce those objects
directly.
Definition 25 A ([0, 1], [0, 1]) game on n players is a mapping v : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]. We
call v surjective, monotonic, or continuous if the mapping is surjective, weakly monotonic
increasing, or continuous, respectively.
As an abbreviation, we speak of a continuous game v if v is a surjective, monotonic,
continuous ([0, 1], [0, 1]) game. Similarly to Definition 4 we call a player i null player in
v, if v(x1, . . . , xn) = v(x1, . . . , xi−1, x
′
i, xi+1, . . . , xn) for all x1, . . . , xn, x
′
i ∈ [0, 1].
As the continuity in a continuous game plays the role of output-roughness in a (j, k)
game, we reformulate Lemma 9 to:
Definition 26 For each continuous game v on n players we define ϕi(v) by
1
n!
∑
pi∈Sn
∫ 1
0
. . .
∫ 1
0
(
vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a)−vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a)
)
−
(
vpi,pi−1(i)(a)−vpi,pi−1(i)(a)
)
dx1 . . . dxn,
where vpi,h(a) = v(a
′
1, . . . , a
′
n) with a
′
l = al if π(l) ≤ h and a
′
l = 1 otherwise; vh(b) =
v(b′1, . . . , b
′
n) with b
′
l = bl if π(l) ≤ h and b
′
l = 0 otherwise, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We remark that the influence measure from Definition 26 satisfies efficiency, anonymity,
the null player and the transfer axiom. Given a continuous game v one can construct a
series of monotonic (j, j) games vj , where j →∞, such that the values of ϕi(v
j) tend to
ϕi(v) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
For the examples vˆ(x1, x2, x3) =
1x2
1
+2x2
2
+3x2
3
6 and v˜(x1, x2, x3) = x1x
2
2x
3
3 the function
ϕ was evaluated in [11]:
ϕ(vˆ) =
(
1
6
,
2
6
,
3
6
)
= (0.16, 0.3, 0.5)
and
ϕ(v˜) =
(
35
144
,
50
144
,
59
144
)
= (0.24305, 0.3472, 0.40972).
While typically the evaluation of ϕ for a continuous game is based on rather tedious
case distinctions, there are simple formulas for special cases, see [12] for more.
6By choosing another segmentation one can implement the evaluation function proposed in [6] to
assign different weights to the output values.
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Theorem 27 Let w1, . . . , wn ∈ [0, 1] with
∑n
i=1wi = 1 and fi : [0, 1] → [0, 1] continuous
monotonic functions with fi(0) = 0 and fi(1) = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, v(x) =∑n
i=1 wi · fi(xi) defines a continuous game and we have ϕi(v) = wi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof. Let q ≤ i ≤ n and π ∈ Sn be arbitrary but fixed. With S = {l ∈ N : π(l) <
π(i)} we have
vpi,pi−1(i)−1(x) =
∑
l∈S
wl · fl(xl) +
∑
l∈N\S
wl · fl(1) =
∑
l∈S
wl · fl(xl) + 1− w(S)
vpi,pi−1(i)(x) =
∑
l∈S
wl · fl(xl) + wi · fi(xi) + 1− w(S)− wi
vpi,pi−1(i)−1(x) =
∑
l∈S
wl · fl(xl) +
∑
l∈N\S
wl · fl(0) =
∑
l∈S
wl · fl(xl)
vpi,pi−1(i)(x) =
∑
l∈S
wl · fl(xl) + wi · fi(xi)
so that
(
vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a)−vpi,pi−1(i)−1(a)
)
−
(
vpi,pi−1(i)(a)−vpi,pi−1(i)(a)
)
= wi. 
So the influence distribution for the example vˆ is no surprise, while for continuous
games similar to v˜ no general and easy to evaluate formula is known.
The analogy to different probabilities for the discrete set of input states is a density
function in the continuous case. An example with density functions f1(x) =
3
4 · (1− x
2),
f2(x) = f2(x) =
3
8 · (1 + x
2) and v(x) equal to the median of x1, x2, x3 was computed in
[11]: ϕ1(v) =
554
13440 ≈ 0.04122 and ϕ2(v) = ϕ3(v) =
563
13440 ≈ 0.04189.
7 Conclusion
We have studied the classical Shapley-Shubik index for simple games in the roll-call model
from [3] and gave a direct combinatorial proof for the fact that the expected number of
cases where a certain player is pivotal is independent from the specific distribution of the
“yes”- and “no”-votes, as long as the probability does only depended on the number of
“yes”-votes. This generalizes the result from [3] and gives a nice and vivid description for
the Shapley-Shubik index that is less artificial than previous ones. We have applied the
roll-call model for the generalized case of j ≥ 2 ordered input and k ≥ 2 ordered output
states. Some notation from simple games can be generalized in a consistent way. By
considering the reduction of uncertainty we have tried to provide a more persuasive basis
for the generalized Shapley-Shubik index from [6] and other places. We do not claim that
this influence measure is the correct generalization of the Shapley-Shubik index and we
agree with the authors of [5] that the status of the Shapley-Shubik index for ternary and
more general games requires further study. For further generalizations of the Shapley-
Shubik index we refer the interested reader to [15]. A first set of results with respect to
the axiomatic approach is presented in order justify the proposed influence measure by
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another approach. In any case we find it advantageous to have an influence measure at
hand that can, to some extend, be consistently defined for larger classes of games with
several levels of approval in the input and output. Even continuous input and output
spaces make sense in decisions on e.g. rate of taxes or other continuous variables.
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